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SUPREME

COURT WATCH
By Reginald C. Oh

I

n General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct.
1236 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court settled a circuit court
conflict over the viability of"reverse age discriminations"
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). The Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that statutorily
protected workers over the age of forty may not bring an
ADEA claim alleging that their employer discriminated
against them in favor ofolder employees.
In Cline, employees between the ages offorty and forty
nine sued their employer, General Dynamics, alleging that a
1997 collective bargaining agreement violated the ADEA.
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to "discrimi
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l). However, only
workers who are at least forty years old are permitted to bring
a cause of action under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
Under the collective bargaining agreement, General Dy
namics eliminated its previous obligation to provide full
health care benefits to employees upon retirement. General
Dynamics, however, agreed to continue to provide full health
care benefits upon retirement to current employees who were
at least fifty years of age on July 1, 1997. The plaintiffs in
Cline were alleging that General Dynamics committed age
discrimination by providing health insurance to employees
over fifty years of age while denying health insurance to em
ployees between the ages offorty and forty-nine.
The question presented in Cline is whether the claim ofage
discrimination by members of the protected class because of
their relative youth is cognizable under the ADEA. Ifthe Cline
plaintiffs had brought a traditional ADEA claim, they would
have alleged that their employer somehow discriminated
against them, employees over forty, in favor of employees
younger than forty. In Cline, however, these same workers be
tween the ages offorty to forty-nine were alleging age discrirn-
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ination in being denied health care benefits upon retirement,
not because of their relative old age, but because of their rela
tive youth in comparison to workers over the age of fifty. In
both a traditional age discrimination situation and in a reverse
age discrimination situation, the same protected class, workers
between the ages offorty and forty-nine, is alleging that age
was used as the basis for an adverse employment decision.
To decide the "reverse age discrimination" issue requires
an inquiry into the central purpose of the ADEA. Was the
ADEA meant to prohibit discrimination against the old in
favor ofthe young, or was the ADEA meant to protect against
any discrimination on the basis of age, as long as the class or
person alleging discrimination is at least forty years old?
In Cline, the federal district court dismissed the lawsuit,
ruling that the ADEA does not recognize a claim for "reverse
age discrimination," a claim in which younger employees al
lege that they were discriminated against in favor of older
employees. A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court ruling, holding that the plain meaning of the
ADEA prohibits age discrimination regardless ofwhether it
is discrimination against the younger in favor of the older, or
discrimination against the older in favor of the younger. The
Sixth Circuit's decision was contrary to the decisions in other
circuits, which held that reverse age discrimination was not
cognizable under the ADEA.
The Court granted certiorari and reversed the Sixth Cir
cuit decision. The Court, in a majority decision written by
Justice Souter, held that the "reverse age discrimination
claims" are not cognizable based upon the language of the
ADEA, because the "text, structure, purpose, and history of
the ADEA" shows that the statute "does not mean to stop an
employer from favoring an older worker over a younger one."
124 S. Ct. at 1248-49. The Court reasoned that when the
ADEA prohibits discrimination because of an individual's
"age," the use ofthe term "age" in the ADEA means the com
monly understood, narrow sense of"old age," rather than the
broader definition of age as marking the length of a person's
life. In other words, the Court held that under the ADEA,
the statute effectively prohibits an employer from discrimi
nating against an employee on account of his or her old age,
rather than prohibiting employers from discriminating on the
basis of age generally.
The Court justified its narrow statutory construction of
the term "age" on several grounds. First, the Court conclud
ed that upon review ofthe legislative history surrounding the
enactment of the ADEA, the core concern of Congress in
enacting the statute was to protect "a relatively old worker
from discrimination that works to the advantage of the rela
tively young." 124 S. Ct. at 1243.
Second, the Court supported its statutory analysis by em
phasizing that the statute restricts the protected class that
may bring suit under the ADEA to those forty years old and
older. The Court reasoned, "If Congress had been worrying
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about protecting the younger against the older, it would not
likely have ignored everyone under 40." Id
Third, the Court rejected the argument made by dissent
ing Justice Clarence Thomas that the term "age" must be
treated in the same way that the terms "race" and "sex" are
treated forTitle VII purposes. Title VII prohibits discrimina
tion in employment on the basis of race and sex. While the
original purpose ofTitle VII was to protect racial minorities
and women, Title VII's language has been expanded to in
clude all racial discrimination claims, whether made by
whites or racial minorities, and it has been expanded to in
clude all sex discrimination claims, whether made by men or
women. Similarly, Justice Thomas contended that the term
"age" should be understood to prohibit all age discrimination,
whether the discrimination is against the relatively young or
the relatively old.
In rejecting the dissent's analysis, the Court used a lin
guistic move to conclude that the term age should not be
treated in the same way that the terms race and sex are em
ployed for Title VII purposes. The Court reasoned:
"Race" and "sex" are general terms that in every day usage
require modifiers to indicate any relatively narrow applica
tion. We do not commonly understand "race" to refer only
to the black race, or "sex" to refer only to the female. But the
prohibition of age discrimination is readily read more nar
rowly than analogous provisions dealing with race and sex.

Id at 1247. In other words, the Court reasoned that statutory
interpretation should be influenced by the common usage of
terms in everyday usage.
Whether the result in Cline makes sense from a policy
standpoint, the Cline Court's reasoning is flawed. A strong ar
gument can be made that the central purpose of the ADEA
was not only to protect relatively older workers from discrim
ination in favor ofrelatively younger workers. Rather, an argu
ment can be made that the central purpose ofthe ADEA was
to protect the class of older workers, regardless of whether
these workers above the age offorty are being adversely treat
ed based on their relatively youth or based on their relative
agedness. In other words, even accepting the Court's interpre
tation of"age" for ADEA purposes to mean "old age," that
interpretation still supports permitting the workers in Cline to
make a cognizable reverse age discrimination claim.
To understand the last point more clearly, a hypothetical is
in order. Imagine that an employer decided to provide full
health care benefits upon retirement only to workers over the
age of eighty. An employee aged seventy-nine wants to sue
under the ADEA and allege age discrimination. This admit
tedly unlikely scenario presents the same issue of"reverse age
discrimination'' raised in Cline. Under the Cline Court's rea
soning, however, the seventy-nine year old would not have a
cognizable ADEA claim, because he or she is claiming dis
crimination on the basis of his or her relative youth in com
parison to relatively older eighty year old employees.
A strong _argument can be made that the hypothetical re
verse discrimination claim alleged by a seventy-nine year old
worker presents a fairly compelling case ofage discrimination
that ought to be prohibited by the ADEA. It should be ir
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relevant that the seventy-nine year old is being disfavored in
comparison to workers even older than him or her, because
the bottom line is, a statutorily defined elderly worker is
being treated adversely on account of his age. In other words,
it could be argued that the class of forty to forty-nine year
olds in Cline is in actuality still alleging discrimination based
on "old age" as defined by the ADEA.
Ultimately, even if the Court's statutory reasoning lay on
untenable grounds, its restriction of the scope of the ADEA
implicitly acknowledges that the ADEA has strayed very far
off course from its original purposes. As Professor Samuel Is
sacharoff argues, contrary to original beliefs, the phenomenon
of aging in the workplace does not fit in neatly with the anti
discrimination paradigm associated with constitutional and
statutory prohibitions against invidious racism and sexism. See
Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimina
tion Really Age Discrimination? TheADEA's Unnatural Solu
tion, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 780 (1997). Discrimination against
elderly workers reflects costs rather than animus or prejudice
for the simple reason that older workers tend to be more ex
pensive workers. Thus, Professor Issacharoff challenges the
use of an anti-discrimination framework to deal with age-re
lated issues involving economics and not animus or prejudice.
"If the source of risk to older workers is economics ... a real
question emerges as to why this problem should be folded into
the antidiscrimination rubric." Id. at 800. Accordingly, in
Cline, the denial ofhealth benefits to workers under fifty years
old probably does not reflect hostility to "younger-older"
workers but instead, it likely reflects the employer's attempt
to draw an admittedly arbitrary line to save costs.
The Court's decision to reject "reverse age discrimination''
claims under the ADEA, then, does not reflect a straight
forward application of techniques of statutory construction
and interpretation. Instead, it may reflect the Court's notion
that the discrimination that occurred in Cline reflects the re
alities and legitimacy of economic-based age discrimination
engaged by employers, age-based employment practices that
are increasingly denying benefits to "younger-older" workers.
Such practices include Early Retirement Incentive Plans
provided for employees only over a certain age. The complex
ities raised by the problem of reverse age discrimination
should spark Congress to consider amending the ADEA to
reflect the economic realities behind age-based decision
making in the employment context.
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